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When people book vacations on cruise ships they envision the fun they will have 
snorkeling, sightseeing and exploring the beaches.  Recently, however, the media and public 
advocates have begun to scrutinize cruise ships for several reasons.  A quick internet search will 
turn up a plethora of public outcry demanding cruise lines fix problems that passengers 
unknowingly face every time they go aboard a cruise ship.1  When buying tickets, outbreaks of 
norovirus or sustaining a serious injury are far from the mind of most passengers.2  These issues 
are quite prevalent, however, and vacationers should be able to rely on the ship’s infirmary to 
prevent the spread of serious illnesses and treat injuries. 
Absent the minds of most passengers, cruise ship companies are bound almost exclusively 
by nineteenth century maritime law which differs significantly from the common and statutory law 
governing land-based torts.3  In what has become known as the “Barbetta rule,” passengers are 
barred from bringing a medical malpractice lawsuit against a cruise ship company for injuries 
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1 Seth Cline, The 8 Worst Cruise Ship Disasters, U.S. NEWS, (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/14/the-eight-worst-cruise-ship-disasters; see also Meredith Galante, 
10 Other Horrifying Cruise Ship Disasters, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/costa-concordia-cruise-ship-disasters-2012-1.  
2 Centers for Disease Control and Protection, Vessel Sanitation Program: Facts About Noroviruses on Cruise Ships, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/vsp/pub/norovirus/norovirus.htm (last updated Aug. 5, 2013) (providing facts regarding 
contagious noroviruses which spread easy aboard cruise ships where many people are in close quarters). 
3 Thomas A. Dickerson & Jeffrey A. Cohen, Medical Malpractice on the High Seas, N.Y. L. J. 1 (Mar. 3, 2015), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCert_pdfs/Dickerson_Docs/medicalmalpractice.pdf (“[P]assengers may 
travel on 21st-century cruise ships, but their rights and remedies for injuries sustained on or off the cruise ship are 
governed, in many cases, by 19th-century legal principles.”). 
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suffered at the hands of medical physicians in the ship’s infirmary.4  Unlike hospitals which can 
be held vicariously liable for a doctor’s medical negligence, the Barbetta rule reflects the long 
standing admiralty and maritime tradition that ship owners should not be held vicariously liable 
for medical negligence occurring within the infirmary because physicians are aboard the ship 
merely for the convenience of passengers and cannot control the patient’s treatment.5  Under this 
logic, a cruise ship company bears no responsibility for onboard medical negligence despite the 
infirmary being the only medical facility passengers can access while at sea. 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has recently taken a stand against the Barbetta rule’s 
applicability to cruise ships in one of its latest decisions, Franza v. Royal Caribbean.6  The 
Eleventh Circuit created a split between the circuit courts by holding in direct conflict with the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, which was the last case agreeing with the 
maritime tradition and gave it a name – the Barbetta Rule.7 
The intention of this Article is not to analyze possible reasons for the validity of such a 
rule.  Rather, this Article brings to light a newly-created circuit split and suggests a solution based 
on a thorough analysis of the issue.  One of the questions this Article addresses is: how a hospital 
may be held vicariously liable for medical malpractice committed by doctors, but yet a cruise ship 
is usually exempt from the doctrine of respondeat superior for identical medical malpractice 
claims? And in doing so, this Article argues for the adoption of a uniform rule that dismisses the 
                                                          
4 See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988). 
5 Compare Bercel v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 21, 24–25 (Tex. 1994) (a patient may bring a 
negligence claim against a mental hospital despite the treating psychiatrist’s status as an independent contractor 
because the hospital was required by statute to ensure patients received “adequate medical and psychiatric care and 
treatment”), and Blanton v. Moses Cone Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 457–59 (N.C. 1987) (a patient may allege that a 
hospital is vicariously liable for the malpractice committed by the treating doctor even though the doctor was not the 
hospital’s agent because based on ordinary negligence at common law, a reasonably prudent hospital would have 
found it necessary to ascertain the doctor’s qualifications prior to allowing him to perform surgery), with Barbetta, 
848 F.2d at 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988), and O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266–67 (Mass. 1891). 
6 Franza v. Royal Caribbean, 772 F.3d 1225, 1238 (11th Cir. 2014). 
7 Id.; Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1367, 1369–70. 
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logic behind applying the Barbetta rule to today’s cruise ships.  By using the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Franza as the initial framework, this Article offers a modern rule allowing passengers 
injured by onboard medical malpractice to bring a claim against a cruise ship company.  Only once 
such suggestions are implemented uniformly will medical patients aboard cruise ships receive the 
same protections afforded to patients treated at healthcare facilities on land. 
To develop a solution, the roots of maritime law must be examined to interpret the 
complexities that make an easy solution to this problem almost impossible.  Part II of this Article 
offers a detailed synopsis of the origins of maritime law that provides the basis for the Barbetta 
rule.  An understanding reveals that, in some respects, maritime law has drifted away from other 
bodies of law.  Part III addresses the circuit split at the core of this Article.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Barbetta relied on traditional maritime law to deny a vacationer the ability to bring a 
claim alleging medical malpractice against the carrier cruise line.8  The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling 
finds that a passenger may bring a claim against a cruise ship owner for medical malpractice 
committed by the carrier’s employed physician aboard the ship.9  Part IV analyzes the circuit split 
between the Fifth and Eleventh circuits and articulates possible solutions by analyzing traditional 
maritime law in the context of the modern cruise vacation industry.  Lastly, this Article concludes 
by arguing that the other circuit courts should adopt the Eleven Circuit’s conclusion.  Not only 
does the proposed solution provide fairness, but based on the circumstances of present day 
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II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE BARBETTA RULE 
A. Maritime and Admiralty Jurisdiction 
 Maritime and admiralty law is its own body of law with original jurisdiction to hear such 
cases residing with the federal judiciary.10  The Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases…of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”11  This means that the federal 
courts will typically have original jurisdiction to hear any issue regarding admiralty and maritime 
law.  But what matters constitute admiralty or maritime?  Moreover, what substantive laws are 
federal courts to apply to maritime and admiralty lawsuits? 
 Pre-twentieth century cases defining the scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
provided that such jurisdiction exists when the wrong occurs on “navigable waters.”12  Over time, 
however, this simple distinction became murky as cases arose in which the wrong originated on 
land, but was later suffered on the water, or vice versa.13  To resolve this problem, the Supreme 
Court touched upon the test for determining admiralty and maritime jurisdiction by stating that not 
only must the wrong occur on navigable waters, but must also bear a “maritime nexus – some 
relationship between the tort and traditional maritime activities[.]”14  As it relates to the issue at 
hand, onboard medical malpractice is a tort that bears a maritime nexus to maritime activities and, 
therefore, is within the maritime and admiralty jurisdiction. 
 The federal judiciary has explained that “with admiralty jurisdiction comes the application 
of substantive admiralty law.”15  Without relevant legislation from Congress, the federal judiciary 
                                                          
10 U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1. 
11 Id. 
12 Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 34–36 (1866). 
13 See e.g., Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933); Hess v. United States, 259 F.2d 285, 289–90 (9th Cir. 
1958); Chapman v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 963–64 (1967).   
14 Exec. Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 256 (1972). 
15 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). 
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is to impose general maritime case law.16  The general maritime law is defined as “an amalgam of 
traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, modifications of those rules, and newly 
created rules” specifically tailored to the admiralty and maritime industry.17  This explains the 
difference between medical malpractice claims brought against a hospital versus a cruise ship 
company.  While a patient’s ability to bring a medical malpractice suit against a hospital has been 
codified by statute and recognized by case law, no statute allows for a passenger to initiate a lawsuit 
against a ship owner for medical negligence.18  Moreover, the relevant case law holds to the 
contrary by barring claims against the ship owner for onboard medical negligence because a 
treating physician was brought aboard for the convenience of the passengers and the ship owner 
does not have any control over the treatment received by the claimant-passenger.19   
B. Evolution of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against Hospitals and Medical Centers 
The sharp distinction between hospitals and ship infirmaries did not always exist.  In fact, 
hospitals and related medical centers once benefitted from a broad protection from the doctrine of 
respondeat superior in part due to the “charitable immunity doctrine” 20 which was applied in a 
similar fashion to the Barbetta rule. 
American hospitals were traditionally exempt from vicarious liability arising from a 
doctor’s medical negligence.21  Hospitals were predominately charitable institutions financed by 
religious organizations and the philanthropy of the wealthy.22  The premise of the charitable 
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 864–65. 
18 Robert D. Peltz, Has Time Passed Barbetta By?, 25 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 7–9 (2011) (discussing guidelines that 
cruise ships adhere to, but noting the lack of regulations or applicable laws aimed at protecting vacationers who seek 
onboard treatment). 
19 See Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887); O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 
266–67 (Mass. 1891); The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1918). 
20 See Roger N Braden & Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Evolution – Rebuking the 





immunity doctrine was that hospitals should not be liable for negligent treatment rendered by a 
doctor because these facilities were established merely to help the sick and insane rather than to 
profit off attempts to cure and prevent disease.23   
Additionally, looking back to the 1800s, case law on this issue was sparse because only a 
small percentage of physicians treated patients in hospitals.24  Typically, doctors would visit, and 
even perform surgery, on patients within their homes.25  As a result, identical to the Barbetta rule, 
the charitable immunity doctrine took form and shielded hospitals from vicarious liability arising 
out of a doctor’s negligence.26  
 At the turn of the twentieth century, advancements in medical technology and the health 
care system spurred reformations of these traditions.27  Hospitals were no longer considered 
secondary or lower-class institutions for health care because the convenience of modern equipment 
and a central staff attracted many doctors, drawing them away from making house calls.28  Over 
time, health care institutions became an accepted place to perform operations and evaluate patients.  
Even wealthy patients who once preferred the comfort of their homes began to embrace the 
centralized quality care that hospitals were now able to provide.29 
 Gradually, heath care institutions grew from merger facilities reliant on charity into 
complex medical centers focused primarily on profitability.30  The control of hospitals began to 
transfer from the hands of religious organizations and good Samaritans to the medical physicians 
themselves or a board of directors.31  This conflict resulted in the erosion of the charitable 
                                                          
23 Id. at 678, 681; see also McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). 
24 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 677.  
25 Id. at 677–78. 
26 Id. at 678. 
27 Id. at 677–78. 
28 Id. at 678. 
29 Id., (citing BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 32 (3d ed. 1997)). 
30 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 681. 
31 Id. at 679. 
7 
 
immunity doctrine as it became unequitable to shield hospitals from vicarious liability while 
allowing such institutions to profit from treatment rendered by their physicians.32  
 The medical malpractice system we are all accustomed to developed from this evolution, 
and is premised on three primary justifications: society finds it appropriate for an innocent victim 
to recover from the negligent individual who caused the victim’s injury or loss; the innocent victim 
should not be “rendered destitute, and socially unproductive” because of a lack of financial means 
to remediate the injuries sustained’ and to serve as a deterrent effect for health care professionals 
and providers to ensure proper services will be rendered in the future.33  To accomplish these 
justifications, those who have suffered injuries or loss due to a physician’s medical negligence 
may hold the professional as well as the health care provider vicariously liable for the claimant’s 
damages pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.34  Medical providers could be held 
vicariously liable on the basis of apparent agency.35  Accordingly, courts began to utilize judicial-
made tests to chip away at the charitable immunity doctrine by establishing a hospital’s liability 
for a physician’s negligence.36 
C. Development of the Barbetta rule 
 New York federal court presided over one of the first cases contributing to the development 
of the Barbetta rule.  In Laubheim v. De Koninglyke Neder Landsche Stoomboot Maatschappy, a 
passenger aboard a steamship from Rotterdam to New York fell and severely injured her knee.37  
The passenger was escorted to the vessel’s surgeon, an employee of the steamboat company.38  
                                                          
32 Id. 
33 John Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability and Disintermediation in Managed Care, 29 
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 307–309 (2001). 
34 Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusion into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice, Thoughts About the Deterrent 
Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 946–47 (1984). 
35 Id. 
36 Braden & Lawrence, supra note 20, at 680. 
37 Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887).  
38 Id.  
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The injured passenger subsequently sued the steamboat company alleging that the surgeon’s 
treatment was so poor that her leg had to be amputated once she arrived in New York.39 
 The court stated that when a ship owner or carrier hires a surgeon, the owner or carrier has 
a duty to ensure the surgeon is “reasonably competent.”40  Thus, a ship owner or carrier can only 
be liable if it fails to hire a “reasonably competent” medical professional.41  Since the steamboat 
company exercised reasonable care and diligence in hiring its surgeon, the company was not liable 
for any negligent medical treatment the passenger claimed to have received onboard the 
steamboat.42 
This shield from vicarious liability was further discussed in O’Brien v. Cunard.43  In 
O’Brien, all passengers were required by law to receive a vaccination prior to landing in 
Massachusetts.44  Accordingly, the carrier employed a medical physician to administer the 
vaccination to all passengers before the vessel reached its final destination.45  One passenger sued 
the carrier after arriving in Massachusetts, arguing that she was negligently vaccinated by the 
physician while aboard the vessel.46 
 The court reiterated that once a carrier decides to bring aboard a physician, the carrier 
undertakes the duty to ensure the medical professional hired is competent to perform all tasks 
reasonably expected of a physician aboard a ship for such a voyage.47  Because the carrier satisfied 
its obligation to employ a competent doctor, the carrier was not vicariously liable for any 
                                                          




43 O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 266–67. 
46 Id. at 266. 
47 Id. at 266–67. 
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negligence committed by the physician in performing the medical services he was employed by 
the carrier to provide.48  Further, the court articulated that: 
[t]he law does not put the business of treating sick passengers into the 
charge of common carriers, and make them responsible for the proper 
management of it.  The work which the physician or surgeon does in 
such cases is under the control of the passengers themselves.  It is their 
business, not the business of the carrier…owners of the ship cannot 
interfere in the treatment of the medical officer when he attends [to] a 
passenger.49 
  
 From this holding, the federal judiciary formulated the law that will eventually be termed 
the Barbetta rule.50  The ship owner or carrier’s duty is merely to ensure it employs a reasonably 
competent and qualified medical physician and supplies the professional with the equipment 
necessary to properly treat those onboard.51  Once the ship owner or carrier has fulfilled these 
obligations, a passenger cannot hold the ship’s owner vicariously liable for negligent treatment 
rendered by the physician because the owner cannot interfere or exercise control over the 
treatment.52  Additionally, an owner is not in the business of providing medical services to its 
passengers.53  Rather, the physician is employed and brought aboard for the mere convenience of 
the passengers who may elect to seek treatment from the onboard medical professional(s).54  This 
logic was carried into the twentieth century where it was strengthened by subsequent cases brought 
                                                          
48 Id. 
49 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266. 
50 See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1371–72 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that a cruise ship company can 
only be vicariously liable for an employed medical physician’s negligence if the company negligently hired the 
medical physician at fault for the claimant’s injuries). 
51 See e.g., id., at 1369; The Great N., 251 F. 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1918); Di Bonaventure v. Home Lines, Inc., 536 F. 
Supp. 100, 103 (E.D.Penn. 1982); Branch v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 11 F. Supp. 832, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); 
The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 159–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1904); O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891); 
Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887). 
52 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267; see also Churchill v. United Fruit Co., 294 F. 400 (D. Mass. 1923); accord The Great N., 
251 F. at 831. 
53 Amdur v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 310 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267; 
Di Bonaventure, 536 F.Supp. at 103. 
54 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 267. 
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by passengers seeking ship owners be held vicariously liable for onboard medical malpractice 
committed by the medical professional(s) hired to administer treatment aboard the ship.55 
III. THE BARBETTA RULE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star extended this maritime shield 
to the cruise line industry by holding that precedent establishes that passengers are barred from 
bringing a claim against a cruise ship company’s negligent treatment rendered on cruise ships.56 
In Barbetta, a married couple vacationing in Mexico sued the cruise ship after the onboard doctor 
failed to discover that Mrs. Barbetta had diabetes while treating her.57  In July of 1986, Mr. and 
Mrs. James and Florence Barbetta (collectively the “Barbettas”) filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the cruise ship - the S.S. Bermuda Star 
(the “Bermuda Star”), the owner of the Bermuda Star, and the company that chartered and operated 
the vacation.58  
 The Barbettas were vacationers aboard the Bermuda Star for a cruise that departed from 
New Orleans and made stops in Florida and various ports in Mexico.59  Shortly after the Bermuda 
Star departed from New Orleans, Mrs. Barbetta became ill and sought the assistance of the medical 
staff aboard the ship the following morning.60  Mrs. Barbetta was treated aboard the Bermuda Star 
from January 26 until January 31.61  During that time, Mrs. Barbetta’s condition continued to 
worsen.62  She was finally transported from the Bermuda Star on January 31 to a hospital after she 
developed severe pneumonia and fell into a coma.63   
                                                          
55 See The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 159–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1904); Churchill, 294 F. at 400. 
56 Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364, 1367, 1369–70. (5th Cir. 1988). 
57 Id. at 1365.            
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1366. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 




 The Barbettas sued the ship and its management for “[medical] malpractice, neglect, 
carelessness, and negligence” committed by the medical staff that treated Mrs. Barbetta aboard the 
Bermuda Star.64  The Barbettas claimed that Mrs. Barbetta originally suffered from a Type-A 
diabetes condition and the medical staff’s failure to properly diagnose the illness resulted in the 
significant deterioration of her health.65  The Barbettas claimed to have incurred $1,000,000 in 
damages which included medical treatment, pain and suffering, lost wages, loss of consortium and 
loss of service, society, and support as a result of the ordeal aboard the Bermuda Star.66  The 
Barbetta’s further alleged that the Bermuda Star, its owners and management were liable because 
they failed in their obligation to employ competent medical professionals and that the malpractice 
occurred during the course and scope of employment rendering the named defendants vicariously 
liable for the negligent medical treatment Mrs. Barbetta received.67   
 In a matter of first impression, the District Court stated that a carrier company is not 
vicariously liable in instances where the ship’s doctor negligently treats a passenger.68  The court 
reasoned that under maritime law, the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot apply to a carrier 
vessel because there is no obligation to employ an onboard medical professional.69  The court 
further reasoned that holding such parties liable would result in carrier vessels refusing to bring 
doctors aboard a ship entirely rather than to supply medical treatment as an added convenience to 
passengers.70  Additionally, the ticket the Barbettas purchased contained a contract with a 
disclaimer provision that made it clear that the doctor aboard was not a “servant or agent” of the 
                                                          
64 Id. 
65 Id. (alleging that had the doctor properly diagnosed Mrs. Barbetta’s condition she would never have suffered from 
the later incurred medical emergencies). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 





Bermuda Star, and that the company would not be liable for the doctor’s malpractice.71  The 
District Court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of all named defendants.72  The 
Fifth Circuit subsequently took the case on appeal to determine the issue of whether the doctrine 
of respondeat superior imposes liability on the cruise ship company if a doctor employed by the 
company renders negligent treatment to a passenger. 73 
 The Fifth Circuit relied upon the longstanding maritime principle that if a carrier employs 
a doctor, it is done for the convenience of the passengers and the carrier must only ensure that the 
doctor is competent and duly qualified.74  But in either instance, a doctor’s negligence in treating 
a passenger does not fall on the carrier.75  The Barbettas’ claim was determined to conflict with 
general maritime principles  which explain that a medical physician carried aboard is present only 
for a passenger’s mere convenience.76  Carriers are not bound by respondeat superior because the 
ship owner or management of the carrier lack any meaningful control over the doctor which would 
otherwise demonstrate the medical staff aboard is the “servant or agent” of the carrier.77  The mere 
presence of a doctor aboard a ship hired by the carrier for passengers’ convenience does not equate 
to vicarious liability.78 
 The Fifth Circuit in Barbetta acknowledged the lone case endorsing the only conflicting 
view and then immediately dismissed it.79  In Nietes v. American President Lines, Ltd.,80 a 
California District Court opined that a vessel’s medical physician that collects a salary from the 
                                                          
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 1367–68. 
73 Id. at 1368, 1372. 
74 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369 (internal citations omitted).   
75 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
76 Id. (citing O’Brien v. Cunard, 28 N.E. 266, 267 (Mass. 1891)). 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1370–71.  
79 See id. 
80 Nietes v. Am., President Lines, Ltd., 188 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1959). 
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carrier, is regularly employed, and subject to the rules of the carrier is presumed to be an ordinary 
employee.81  Accordingly, the carrier is vicariously liable for any malpractice or negligence 
committed by the onboard physician.82  The Nietes court reasoned that the carrier’s ability to 
exercise control over the treatment methods rendered by an onboard medical professional is an 
unreasonable basis for refusing to hold the carrier liable for the physician’s negligent treatment 
rendered to a passenger.83 
 The Fifth Circuit stated that the Nietes Court misunderstood respondeat superior liability 
by misinterpreting the carrier’s control over the doctor’s general actions versus the requirement to 
control the doctor’s treatment methods.84  In the context of maritime law, the carrier or ship owner 
lacks “the expertise to meaningfully evaluate, and therefore, control a doctor’s treatment of his 
patients and the power, even if it has knowledge, to intrude into the physician-patient 
relationship.”85 
 The Fifth Circuit made one concession in the Barbetta decision.86  The court stated that 
while a carrier does not have an obligation to provide medical personnel for passengers, the carrier 
does have the responsibility of exercising “reasonable care to furnish such aid and assistance as 
ordinarily prudent persons would render under similar circumstances.”87  But simply put, bringing 
aboard a doctor does not create a duty on the carrier pursuant to respondeat superior.88   
 
 
                                                          
81 Id. at 220. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 220–21. 
84 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1370–71.   
85 Id. 





A. The Logic Behind the Fifth Circuit’s Decision: Summing up the Barbetta Rule 
 To clarify, the issue at hand is governed by maritime common law because these are tort 
actions claimed to have occurred while in navigable waters.89  Maritime law and an overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions and circuits have “establish[ed] that a cruise line cannot be held 
vicariously liable for the negligence of its ship’s doctor in the care and treatment of passengers.”90  
If and when a carrier opts to bring a doctor aboard for its passengers, the carrier has the obligation 
of ensuring the doctor is “competent and duly qualified.”91  The carrier’s duty is satisfied when 
the carrier is deemed to have diligently inquired into the competency of the doctor.92  If the carrier 
breaches this duty, it is responsible only for its own negligence; never the negligence of the 
doctor.93  Under maritime principles, the carrier’s only responsibility is to guarantee an employed 
medical professional is duly qualified and is a competent medical physician.94   
 The basis for this principle in admiralty law contains two primary justifications: a cruise 
ship does not possess the expertise to control and supervise the doctor when treating a passenger 
and that the carrier does not have any control over the patient-physician relationship that exists 
between the passengers and the onboard medical staff.95  Therefore, a passenger may bring a claim 
against a carrier for negligent hiring but cannot seek relief under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for medical malpractice.96  The premise underlying this rationale is that there is no 
maritime law that requires a carrier to bring aboard a doctor since they are not in the business of 
                                                          
89 See Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1990). 
90 Doonan v. Carnival Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2005); see also Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 
F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir. 1988); The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1918). 
91 Barbetta 848 F. 2d at 1371. 
92 Id. at 1367–69. 
93 Id.; see also The Great N., 251 F. 826, 826 (9th Cir. 1918). 
94 O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 28 N.E. 266, 267 (1891). 
95 Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1239–44 (11th Cir. 2014). 
96 Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345–46 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
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providing medical services.97  A ship is not a medical facility and a doctor aboard a carrier is an 
independent medical physician carried by the vessel for the convenience of its passengers.98  The 
passengers are free to seek medical assistance by the medical staff aboard, but such action does 
not render the carrier vicariously liable for the medical staff’s neglect or subsequent malpractice.99   
B. The Franza Decision Creating a Circuit Split 
 The Eleventh Circuit recently split with the Fifth Circuit when the court ruled in direct 
opposition to the long-established maritime law and allowed for a cruise ship passenger to bring 
claims against the carrier for malpractice and negligence.100  In Franza, Pasquale Vaglio 
(“Vaglio”), a passenger aboard a Royal Caribbean cruise ship, fell and suffered a serious head 
injury while docked at the port in Bermuda.101  Vaglio was subsequently taken to the infirmary 
aboard the ship.102  A nurse evaluated Vaglio and found no further treatment was necessary.103  As 
they returned to their cabin, the nurse informed Vaglio’s wife and family to be alert because there 
was a chance Vaglio had sustained a concussion.104   
 Two hours later, Vaglio’s family called 911 while aboard the ship explaining that Vaglio’s 
health had been deteriorating since leaving the infirmary.105  The emergency team aboard was slow 
to respond, and the medical staff refused to proceed without first obtaining a credit card number 
when they finally wheeled Vaglio to the infirmary for the second time.106  After another delay of 
                                                          
97 See Laubheim v. De Koninglyke N.S. Co., 13 N.E. 781, 782 (N.Y. 1887); O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 
267 (Mass. 1891); The Korea Maru, 254 F. 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1918). 
98 Barbetta, 848 F.2d at 1369. 
99 See O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266 (holding that carrier vessels are not liable under respondeat superior because the 
treatment is under the control of the passenger rather than the carrier). 
100 See Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2014). 
101 Id. at 1227. While there is some dispute as to where exactly Vaglio fell, it is certain that Vaglio fell either on a 
loading ramp of the ship or on the dock itself. Id. 
102 Id. at 1229. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1229.  The expenses charged went to Royal Caribbean itself because the company owned the 
infirmary and employed those that operated it. Id.  This is important to note because the origins of the Barbetta rule 
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more than an hour, the onboard doctor evaluated Vaglio and prepared him to be transferred to a 
nearby Bermuda hospital.107  Upon arrival, the medical staff at the hospital concluded too much 
time had lapsed and there was nothing the hospital could do for Vaglio’s internal injuries.108  Sadly, 
Vaglio was airlifted to a hospital in New York the following morning, where he remained in 
intensive care until his death a week later.109 
 On January 10, 2013, Vaglio’s daughter, serving as the representative of the Estate, brought 
a claim against Royal Caribbean.110  Franza argued that, under the doctrine of actual authority, 
Royal Caribbean was liable for the negligent acts of the onboard medical staff serving as Royal 
Caribbean’s agents.111  In the alternative, under apparent authority, Royal Caribbean was liable for 
having “manifested to [Vaglio]…that its medical staff…were acting as its employees and/or 
agents,” and Vaglio “relied to his detriment on his belief that the physician and nurse were direct 
employees or actual agents [of Royal Caribbean Cruises].”112  The District Court dismissed the 
case relying on the Barbetta rule reasoning that the claims were “predicated on duties of care which 
are not recognized under maritime law.”113 
 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that a ship-owner can be held vicariously liable for 
medical malpractice pursuant to the agency relationship Royal Caribbean possessed with the 
negligent medical staff.114  Accordingly, Franza’s complaint alleging Royal Caribbean was 
                                                          
relied on the onboard doctor being an independent contractor rather than an employee. Id. at 1234–35. Additionally, 
it establishes control elements central to the continued validity of the Barbetta rule. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. The complaint initially contained a count of “negligent hiring, retention[,] and training by Royal Caribbean” 
but was abandoned on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Id. 
111  Id. at 1230. 
112 Franza, 772 F.3d at 1230.  
113 Id. (quoting Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (noting that due 
to established maritime principles, Franza failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted)). 
114 Id. at 1238 (emphasis added). 
17 
 
vicariously liable for onboard medical malpractice should not have been dismissed.115  The 
Eleventh Circuit articulated that the existence of an agency relationship in maritime law was a 
question of fact.116  The primary consideration in finding a carrier liable under respondeat superior 
is the carrier’s control over onboard workers as their principal.117  Thus, the elements Franza was 
required to establish were whether: “the [carrier as] principal acknowledge[d] the agent will work 
for it, the agent [manifested] an acceptance of the undertaking, and control by the principal; over 
the actions of the agent [existed].”118 
 Franza’s complaint sufficiently demonstrated the medical personnel aboard the ship were 
employed and paid directly by Royal Caribbean, hired to work aboard the ship in the infirmary 
that was owned and equipped by Royal Caribbean, wore Royal Caribbean uniforms and were 
“under the command of the ship’s superior officers.”119  The Eleventh Circuit determined Royal 
Caribbean had exclusive and total control over the medical professionals aboard.120  With such a 
relationship readily apparent, the Franza court concluded that adherence to the Barbetta rule was 
improper.121   
 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the two prong control test relied upon in past decisions, 
including Barbetta.122  As a policy matter, medical professionals are expected to base treatment on 
their own independent judgment.123  Thus, Royal Caribbean’s alleged inability to control the 
                                                          
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1235–36 (citing Naviera Netuno S.A. v. All Int’l Freight Forwarders, Inc., 709 F. 2d 663, 665 (11th Cir. 
1983)). 
117  Franza, 772 F.3d at 1236. 
118 Id. (quoting Whetstone Candy Co. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 351 F. 3d 1067, 1077 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
119 Id. at 1237. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 1238–39 (noting that courts should no longer “discern a sound basis in law for ignoring the facts alleged in 
individual medical malpractice complaints and wholly discarding the same rules of agency that we have applied to 
other maritime tort cases”). 
122 Id.  
123 Franza, 772 F.3d 1225, 1239–40. 
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doctor’s treatment did not eliminate the possibility of an agency relationship.124  Additionally, the 
carrier’s inability to intrude into a patient-physician relationship is not required for a carrier-doctor 
agency relationship to exist.125  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found no problem with treating the 
agency relationship between carrier and doctor the same as the relationship between a land-based 
medical services company and a doctor.126   
C. Pleading Requirements Post-Franza 
 The Eleventh Circuit recognized the circuit split with the Fifth Circuit and highlighted an 
additional method passengers injured by onboard malpractice may take: apparent authority.127  
Apparent authority is an equitable theory that does not require claimants to establish the control 
element maritime law emphasizes before a court may appropriately impose vicarious liability upon 
the carrier.128  Therefore, apparent authority was recognized as the proper decision if the carrier’s 
conduct equitably prevented it from denying the existence of an agency relationship rather than 
having carrier liability contingent on the notion of control elements.129  
 The Eleventh Circuit concluded it was improper to dismiss Franza’s complaint because the 
doctrine of apparent authority is dependent on the underlying facts.130  The Franza court 
determined that Royal Caribbean represented the medical staff as its agents to Vaglio. 131  These 
representations led Vaglio and his family believe he was under the care of competent and duly 
qualified Royal Caribbean doctors that were authorized to treat him on Royal Caribbean’s behalf, 
and Vaglio relied on those representations and subsequent beliefs to his detriment.132  For these 
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reasons, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower district court’s opinion and allowed Franza to 
bring a suit against Royal Caribbean pursuant to respondeat superior.133 
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
It can no longer be said that a medical physician comes aboard a cruise ship merely for the 
convenience of the passengers.  To a degree, cruise ships are required to have an infirmary operated 
by several qualified physicians.134  Almost without exception, cruise lines have agreed to adhere 
to the standards established by the American College of Emergency Physicians (“ACEP”).135  In 
their publication, the ACEP goes well beyond requiring cruise ships to provide a well supplied 
infirmary for passengers.136  The ACEP’s Health Care Guidelines for Cruise Ship Medical 
Facilities outlines minimum credentialing and training standards, and also includes medical 
policies and procedures that must be followed when treating passengers.137 
Cruise ships now use these infirmaries as an additional means of generating revenue.  When 
a passenger visits a ship’s medical center they are charged a “reasonable fee” for medical 
treatment.138  Although cruise ship companies have refused to disclose their pricing schedules for 
treatment costs, research indicates that the costs equate to standard American medical bills charged 
by American hospitals.139  Over the counter medications may be offered for free in some 
circumstances; however, other cruises have been reported to charge hefty sums for Aspirin.140  
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134 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, Healthcare Guidelines for Cruise Ship Medical Facilities, ACEP Policy 
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While passengers can count on the cruise line ensuring the pharmacy is fully stocked, passengers 
should expect to pay 10 percent over retail at a minimum for prescription drugs.141  Passengers 
should not fear, however, because although medical expenses must be paid out of pocket 
immediately – akin to Vaglio being required to hand over a credit card before seeing a doctor – 
cruise lines even offer medical insurance serving as secondary coverage which will reimburse 
passengers for up to $10,000 in onboard medical services.142 
The salaries paid to cruise ship physicians are significantly less than American doctors 
employed by a hospital.  The average ordinary physician earns $189,000.00 per year.143  
Conversely, doctors working aboard cruise ships make around $80,000.00 less per year than 
doctors working in American hospitals.144  Simple math demonstrates that when all factors are 
equal, including prices charged for treatment, after deducting physician salaries it is obvious that 
a cruise ship’s infirmary generates large revenues for the cruise line.  For these reasons, it is evident 
cruise ships are profiting off of medical services and therefore it is not appropriate to allow cruise 
ships to invoke the Barbetta rule. 
The first justification supporting the Barbetta rule was that cruise ships bring aboard a 
physician merely for the convenience of passengers and are not in the business of providing 
medical services.145  In reality, modern cruise ships have pledged to be bound by the ACEP 
standards which require cruise ships to have an infirmary and several duly qualified physicians 
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aboard to treat passengers.146  Most importantly, cruise ships are in fact in the business of providing 
medical services.  Treating passengers has become a lucrative source of additional revenues on 
cruise ships.147  The change in hospitals from providing medical treatment out of generosity to 
profit-making resulted in the erosion of the charitable immunity doctrine.148  The justification 
being that since hospitals shifted their purpose from assisting the poor and sick to profit generating, 
they cannot seek to utilize equitable immunities employed in the past to incentivize goodwill.149  
Thus, it is time for the rejection of the Barbetta rule because while physicians in the past treated 
passengers for convenience, cruise ships today provide outlined medical services for a profit. 
The second justification for the Barbetta rule – that cruise ship companies cannot be held 
vicariously liable because control over treatment lies solely with the physician and patient – is 
equally unconvincing.150  The Eleventh Circuit has provided a workable method for imposing 
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior that should be adopted by the other 
circuits.151 
The two-prong concept of control is most important to the validity of the Barbetta rule: the 
carrier or ship owner is unable to dictate the types of treatment rendered and cannot interfere with 
a patient-physician relationship.152  These fundamental principles have been embedded in 
nineteenth century maritime law.153  The justification was explained in Barbetta: 
The work the physician or surgeon does…is under the control of the 
passengers themselves.  It is their business, not the business of the 
                                                          
146 Am. College of Emergency Physicians, supra note 134. 
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carrier…The master or owners of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment 
of the medical official when he attends [to] a passenger.  He is not their 
servant engaged in their business, and subject to their control as to his mode 
of treatment.154 
 
Emphasizing this protection from the doctrine of respondeat superior, the Fifth Circuit 
stated that it was inappropriate to hold “shipping companies” vicariously liable because the vessel 
is not “in the business of providing medical services to passengers.”155  The rationale: the lack of 
a “master-servant relationship” between the ship owner and the negligent physician.156 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, opted to take a favorable view of a line of maritime cases 
that focused on whether it would be “unjust and unreasonable” for a carrier to dodge responsibility 
for the negligence of its agents.157  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that along with the recognition 
of control, there is a long tradition in maritime mandating ship owners’ answer for the negligence 
of onboard agents.158  In referencing its broad maritime jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit was never 
bound by the Barbetta rule and “our experience and new conditions [sometimes] give rise to new 
conceptions of maritime concerns.”159  The Eleventh Circuit felt it was time to reject the Barbetta 
rule based on the circumstances and mounting concerns pertaining to this unwavering traditional 
standard safeguarding cruise line companies from onboard medical malpractice claims.160 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that new conditions gave rise to “new conceptions and 
maritime concerns” that required a shift in the relevant legal standard.161  At the turn of the century, 
passenger vessels were being used to transport people from one land mass to another and doctors 
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brought aboard to treat seafaring passengers were not as prevalent.162  Today, however, cruise ship 
owners are benefiting from this same protection despite operating “state-of-the-art cruise ships that 
house thousands of people and operate as floating cities.”163   
The Eleventh Circuit took issue with applying the Barbetta rule when ships are being used 
as traveling vacation resorts “complete with well-stocked modern infirmaries and urgent care 
centers” rather than transporting individuals sprawled across the deck.164  Additionally, where 
ships at the turn of the century would essentially disappear after leaving port, modern technology 
allows for ships to be in constant contact anywhere in the world.165  For these reasons, the Eleventh 
Circuit stated the Barbetta rule is used more as tradition than for “the strength of its reasoning” 
and that “[t]he reasons that originally led other courts to adopt the rule have long since 
disappeared.”166 
While the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the requirement that a claimant must show that the 
ship owner represented the doctor as its agent and that the passenger relied on the representation 
to his or her detriment; the Franza decision made the burden of proof easy to satisfy.167  
Essentially, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that vicarious liability may be imposed under apparent 
authority when a ship owner’s conduct, or subsequent inaction, can equitably prevent it from 
“denying the existence of an agency relationship.”168  Therefore, a passenger bringing suit alleging 
medical malpractice must establish these elements as well as facts that prove the carrier had control 
over the treating physician or onboard medical staff.169 
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 In Franza, the factors considered as “probative” of control in the context of maritime 
respondeat superior (or apparent authority) were: 
1.  Direct evidence of the principal’s right to or actual exercise of control; 
 
2.  The method of payment for an agent’s services, whether by time or by 
the job; 
 
3. Whether or not the equipment necessary to perform the work is furnished 
by the principal; and  
 
4.  Whether the principal had the right to fire the agent.170 
 
Importantly, the entire medical staff were considered members of the ship’s crew and were 
paid directly by Royal Caribbean.171  Additionally, Royal Caribbean paid for the supplies and all 
medical equipment aboard the vessel.172   
After analyzing the circuit split, it has become clear that the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in 
Franza should provide guidance for the other circuits in the future because far from solely 
transporting passengers from one location to another, modern cruise ships have become floating 
resorts attracting vacationers for onboard enjoyment.173  Drifting from traditional maritime 
practices to the more modern tourist industry has caused some confusion with how to apply 
maritime precedent since increasing business also brings along additional liabilities.  Cruise ships 
are not vessels engaged in maritime shipping, nor the sort of vessel incorporated by nineteenth 
century protections from respondeat superior and thus, not protected by the Barbetta rule. 
 The Barbetta rule was established to protect shipping vessels from liability when a third-
party passenger was injured.174  At the turn of the century, when a non-crew member was injured, 
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http://www.royalcaribbean.com/findacruise/experiencetypes/home.do (last visited April 29,2016). 
174 See The Napolitan Prince, 134 F. 159, 160–62 (E.D.N.Y. 1904) (emphasis supplied). 
25 
 
a crew member or someone brought aboard to assist the crew would render treatment.175  The 
court-made rule then became: ship owners cannot be held vicariously liable for negligent treatment 
because there was no duty to those third party passengers.176  The rationale was that to impute 
vicarious liability would result in a refusal to treat injured individuals at a time when ships were 
isolated from the rest of world while out at sea.177 
None of these characteristics or concerns can be attributed to modern cruise ships.  As a 
practical matter, cruise ships are not in the business of “shipping” nor qualify as shipping vessels.  
Rather cruise ship owners used their fleet of ships to take passengers around the ocean to enjoy a 
vacation and then back to the home port.178  Instead of transporting passengers to their new homes 
across the ocean,179 cruise ships are essentially floating hotels that carry passengers on a week-
long vacation before returning home. 
Moreover, essentially all cruise lines have pledged to adhere to the ACEP’s guidelines on 
medical staffing and all other requirements.180  Since these companies have agreed to such 
mandates it has become apparent that cruise lines have agreed to employ a medical physician for 
more than just the “convenience of its passengers.”181  Accordingly, cruise ships are not traditional 
shipping vessels bringing aboard a doctor for convenience and therefore cannot benefit from 
traditional protections afforded to shipping vessels not in the business of treating passengers.182 
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 While modern shipping vessels are outside of the purview of this Article, this protection 
against vicarious liability cannot be imputed to today’s cruise ships.  The fundamental control 
elements of the Barbetta rule are not satisfied by cruise ships.183  The evidence has shown that 
these physicians aboard are part of the new age of infirmaries.  These medical centers house 
doctors and support staff who utilize the same equipment one would find in an ordinary hospital.184  
The doctors are provided a salary directly from the carrier, bill for treatment under the carrier’s 
name, are provided with all supplies and equipment, and report to higher ranking crew members.185  
This is more than sufficient to demonstrate that a master-servant relationship, which was lacking 
a century ago, now exists in the context of cruise lines.186 
 Going forward, if cruise ship owners continue to engage in the practice of offering medical 
treatment and advertise their adherence to the ACEP guidelines, they should expect to find courts 
less inclined to apply the Barbetta rule.  Direct oversight of the actual treatment being rendered 
will never again be the appropriate determination allowing carriers to dodge vicarious liability 
under such circumstances.187  Even so, carriers have gone so far as to make public their medical 
guidelines for potential vacationers that dictate the medications that will be distributed (at a 
determined price) and what treatments, including surgeries, the medical staff will be on-call to 
perform.188 
 While the exact issue remains to be solved, the recent Eleventh Circuit decision has 
provided the judiciary with the route to take when hearing future medical malpractice cases 
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occurring onboard cruise ships.  The Fifth Circuit applied the Barbetta rule out of tradition rather 
than practicality.189  The elements essential to the nineteenth century maritime case law were not 
present in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star.  More importantly, apparent authority allows vacationers 
to recover for the negligent acts of an onboard physician.190  As a doctrine based on the underlying 
facts, it is better aligned to tackle the confusion plagued by maritime law on this issue.  The 
traditional underlying facts that led to the nineteenth century courts to establish protections from 
the doctrine of respondeat superior are not present in the cases regarding medical malpractice 
occurring aboard cruise lines.  As such, the circuits must start to rely less on the traditional Barbetta 
rule and more on the facts of the underlying case to provide vacationers with the chance to bring 
a valid claim for medical malpractice occurring aboard a cruise ship. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 When people book cruise ship vacations they are excited to get away and enjoy themselves.  
But most do not consider the hazards that accompany a cruise excursion.  As cruise ship vacations 
continue to grow in popularity, outbreaks of noroviruses and passengers sustaining serious injuries 
will unfortunately become more frequent.191  Even if a passenger is cautious, he or she reasonably 
expects the medical services offered aboard the ship will provide proper treatment services.  But 
what cannot be anticipated by passengers is an onboard physician’s mistake of negligence.  At the 
heart of this Comment, a passenger may not have a cause of action against the cruise line for a 
physician’s medical negligence.192 
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 The current circuit split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits presents both Congress 
and the Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve a conflict 100 years in the making.  
Providing a remedy to this circuit split will finally bridge the gap between medical malpractice 
claims instituted against a hospital and those brought against a cruise ship company.  Additionally, 
it will prevent future economic and physical harm to passengers who suffer injuries due to 
negligent treatment inside a cruise ship’s medical center.  Accordingly, clarifying this discrepancy 
between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in favor of the Eleventh Circuit is a unique opportunity to 
create bright-line pleading requirements while ensuring passengers aboard cruise ships are 
adequately protected from otherwise latent dangers. 
 
 
